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I. Developments in Negotiations
A. INTRODUCTION
This year's major achievements in the negotiation of international trade agreements were
the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations and the accession of China to
the World Trade Organization (VTO). There was also significant activity in the negotia-
tions of bilateral agreements with Chile and Singapore as well as of the Free Trade Agree-
ment of the Americas. These and other highlights in the negotiations of international trade
agreements in 2001 are summarized below.
B. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENTS
1. Doba Development Agenda
In November 2001, the Trade Ministers, representing the 142 members of the WTO,
launched new multilateral trade negotiations and developed a new work program at the
Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. The Doha Ministerial Declaration
set out an ambitious work program, labeled the "Doha Development Agenda," which calls
for comprehensive three-year negotiations covering a variety of areas affecting international
business and commerce.' Like negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the Doha Development
Agenda negotiations are to be concluded as a single undertaking, meaning that all agree-
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ments will be presented for approval in a single package, with the exception of modifications
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The Doha Ministers set a deadline of January
1, 2005 for conclusion of the negotiations, but early implementation of some agreements
is possible.
In Doha, the Ministers also approved a political Declaration regarding patent rules and
public health and a Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns Raised by Developing
Countries, which addressed developing country concerns, related to their commitments to
implement previous WATO Agreements and their need for technical assistance. Both doc-
uments were critically important to developing countries and played significant roles in the
successful launch of new negotiations.
To oversee the negotiations, the Ministers established a Trade Negotiating Committee
(TNC), which convened its first meeting on January 28, 2002. Negotiations will be con-
ducted at the WTO's headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. The Fifth Ministerial Confer-
ence will be held in 2003-the mid-point of the three-year negotiations-in Mexico, to
review the progress of the negotiations. The Ministerial Conference, which is the highest-
level decision-making body of the 'NTO, must meet "at least once every two years," as
required by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.2 The major elements of the
Doha Development Agenda are reviewed in the following section.
Agriculture: Negotiations on agricultural issues were initiated in early 2000 under Article 20
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, which provided a framework for further
agricultural negotiations.3 Accordingly, negotiating proposals were submitted on behalf of
121 Members. Building on that work, the Doha Ministerial (paragraphs 13 and 14) set a
comprehensive negotiating mandate that is intended to result in substantial improvements
in market access, reductions-with a view to phasing out-of all forms of export subsidies,
and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.' Based on the modalities for
further commitments to be established by March 31, 2003, participants must submit their
draft schedules of specific commitments by the Fifth Ministerial Conference.
Services: The Doha Declaration (paragraph 15) builds on negotiations already underway on
trade in services.5 Services negotiations were initiated in January 2000 under Article XIX of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which called for progressive liberalization
of services. 6 As with agriculture, Members submitted a number of proposals on a wide range
of service sectors and several horizontal issues, as well as on movement of natural persons.
The Doha Declaration reaffirmed the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations, adopted
by the Council for Trade in Services on March 28, 2001 as the basis for continuing the
negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda to achieve greater services liberalization.
The Doha Ministerial established a rigorous timetable for the negotiations, directing that
initial requests for specific commitments be submitted byJune 30, 2002 and setting a deadline
of March 31, 2003 for the submission of initial offers. The Declaration sets the stage for the
commencement of negotiations on new liberalization commitments, including in the tele-
communications, financial services, energy, audio visual and express delivery sectors.
2. VTO, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. IV, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
(Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
3. WTO, Agreement on Agriculture, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://
www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
4. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 13-14.
5. Id. para. 15.
6. VWTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services, RESULTS OF ThE URUGUAY ROUND (Apr. 15, 1994), available
at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
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- Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products: The Doha Ministerial (paragraph 16) launched
tariff negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating tariffs, including the reduction or elim-
ination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers.7 The
negotiations will particularly focus on products of export interest to developing countries.
The negotiations will be comprehensive in terms of product coverage, with no a priori ex-
clusions of products, meaning that no Member may exclude any sector or product at the
outset. The negotiations must "take fully into account the special needs and interests of
developing and least-developed country participants, including through less than full reci-
procity in reduction commitments."8 The negotiating mandate to reduce tariff and non-tariff
barriers on industrial products, with modalities to be agreed upon, will enable the WTO
Members to pursue a variety of tariff liberalization initiatives, potentially, including landmark
agreements such as a second Information Technology Agreement.
* Intellectual Property: The Doha Ministerial issued a separate Declaration on the TRIPS
(Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement and Public Health. The Declaration
highlights provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that provide Members with the flexibility to
address public health emergencies, such as epidemics of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and ma-
laria.9 Specifically, it affirms that the TRIPS Agreement "can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of VWTO Members' right to protect public health and,
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."' 0 Through the Declaration, Members
expressed strong support for the TRIPS Agreement and affirmed the importance of intel-
lectual property protection for the development of new drugs. To address the concern that
WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement, the Doha Ministers instructed the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious
solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.
The Doha Ministerial also agreed to complete the work started in the TRIPS Council on
the implementation of TRIPS Article 23.4 (Additional Protection for Geographical Indica-
tions for Wines and Spirits) by launching negotiations for the establishment of a multilateral
system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits by
the Fifth Ministerial. The Ministers also agreed to extend until January 1, 2016 the time by
which least-developed WTO Members must implement TRIPS provisions on protecting
patent rights for pharmaceutical products.
* WTO Rules: The Doha Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 28) provides for a two-phase
process of negotiations to clarify and improve the disciplines under the Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement) and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and on trade distorting practices that give rise to dump-
ing and countervailing duties." The Declaration provides that the negotiations must preserve
the "basic concepts, principles and effectiveness" of those Agreements and their instru-
ments."1 In the context of these negotiations, WTO Members will also attempt to clarify and
improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, giving consideration to the importance of
this sector to developing countries.
The Doha Declaration (paragraph 29) also calls for negotiations aimed at clarifying and
improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions that apply to re-
7. Doba Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 16.
8. Id.
9. WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/Min(01)/
DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visitedJuly 24, 2002).
10. Id.
11. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 28.
12. Id.
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gional trade agreements. 3 The negotiations are to take into account the developmental as-
pects of such agreements.
" Dispute Settlement Understanding: The Doha Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 30) calls for
negotiations to improve and clarify WTO rules on dispute settlement procedures (Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU)) "based on the work done thus far as well as any additional
proposals by Members."' 4 The DSU negotiations, which are the only exception to the single
undertaking commitment, are to be concluded by May 2003, with entry into force as soon
as possible thereafter. The negotiations will provide an opportunity for the WTO to refine
dispute settlement systems based on the experiences of Members over the past six years.
Among the issues to be taken up are problems with the compliance phase of the dispute
settlement process, which arose, e.g., in the EU Bananas dispute, as well as the need for
increased transparency of the dispute settlement procedures.
" Investment: The Doha Declaration (paragraphs 20-22) sets the objective of establishing the
first multilateral framework aimed at securing transparent, stable, and predictable conditions
for Foreign Direct Investment worldwide, with a two-stage negotiation.'5 During the first
stage, the existing WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment
will clarify issues such as: scope and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities
for pre-establishment commitments based on a positive list approach (such as that used for
the GATS); exceptions; balance-of-payments; safeguards and consultation and the settlement
of disputes between members. At the Fifth Ministerial, Members will decide by "explicit
consensus" on the timing and specific content of the negotiations. The Declaration also
commits the WTO to work with other relevant intergovernmental organizations, including
UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide assistance
by responding to the needs of developing and least-developed countries by way of enhanced
support for technical assistance and capacity building.
" Competition: In Doha, the Ministers agreed (paragraphs 23-25) to a modest two-stage ne-
gotiation.' 6 In the first stage, the WTO will focus on clarification of "core principles, in-
cluding transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness and provisions on hardcore
cartels."' 7 At the Fifth Ministerial, a decision will be made, based on an "explicit consensus,"
on the timing and specific content of the negotiations.
" Transparency in Government Procurement: The Doha Ministers agreed (paragraph 26) to ne-
gotiate an agreement providing for enhanced transparency in the government procurement
procedures of all WTO Members.'" The negotiations will be launched after the Fifth Min-
isterial, following a decision taken at that Ministerial by "explicit consensus" on the modalities
of the negotiations. The negotiations will build on the progress made in the Working Group
on Transparency in Government Procurement since its establishment in 1996. The negoti-
ations must take into account participants' development priorities, especially those of least-
developed country participants. The negotiations will not incorporate market access com-
mitments, which means that Members may maintain preferential procurement programs.
" Trade Facilitation: The Doha Ministers embarked (paragraph 27) on a focused program lead-
ing to negotiations aimed at meeting the needs of a fast-paced global economy.'9 Ministers
agreed to work on new WTO rules to make customs procedures at international borders
13. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 29.
14. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 30.
15. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 20-22.
16. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 23-25.
17. Id.
18. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 26.
19. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 27.
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more transparent and efficient. Members will decide on modalities of negotiations at the
Fifth Ministerial, on the basis of a decision to be taken by "explicit consensus." At that time,
negotiations will be launched on WTO rules for expediting the movement and clearance of
goods crossing borders, building on relevant GATT Articles (Articles V (transit), VIII (for-
malities), and X (transparency).
Trade and the Environment: The Ministerial Declaration (paragraphs 31-3 3) approved a pack-
age of environmental elements that demonstrates the WTO's commitment to sustainable
development and simultaneously advancing trade, environment, and development interests.2 0
For the first time, WTO Ministers called for negotiations on the relationship between the
WTO rules and the specific trade-related obligations of multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEA). The results of those negotiations will affect only WTO Members who are
parties to a particular MEA. The Declaration also calls for negotiations to focus on proce-
dures for information exchanges between the MEA secretariats and the relevant WTO com-
mittees. In addition, the Declaration strengthens the role of the Committee on Trade and
the Environment. Finally, the Ministers called for the negotiation of the reduction or elim-
ination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services. As noted above,
WTO Members will also undertake negotiations of WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies.
Electronic Commerce: The Doha Ministerial took note (paragraph 34) of the work done in the
W'TO General Council and other relevant bodies since 1998 on electronic commerce and
agreed to continue the Work Program on Electronic Commerce." It also instructed the
General Council to consider the most appropriate institutional arrangements for handling
the Work Program, and to report on further progress at the Fifth Ministerial. The Doha
Declaration also maintains the current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic
transmissions until the Fifth Ministerial.
Governance/Capacity Building: The Doha Declaration (paragraphs 38-41) set an agenda aimed
at strengthening the operations of the WTO, its cooperation with other international insti-
tutions, capacity building/development, and promoting greater transparency in WTO ne-
gotiations.22 The declaration recognizes the special needs and interests of developing coun-
tries, and provides for technical assistance for capacity building during negotiations and
subsequent implementation of agreements.
In December 2001, the WTO General Council adopted a budget package that will sub-
stantially increase funding for technical cooperation for developing countries. The package
includes the creation of a new trust fund for technical cooperation activities with a target for
funding in 2002 of SFR 15 million, a doubling of the WTO's trade policy training program
for developing countries. The WTO will also provide additional resources to assist the thirty-
six developing countries that cannot afford permanent representation in Geneva.
* Trade, Debt, and Finance: The Declaration (paragraph 36) provides for the establishment of
a Working Group under the auspices of the WTO General Council to examine and to
provide a progress report at the Fifth Ministerial on the relationship between trade, debt,
and finance.3 The Ministerial Declaration recognizes the individual mandates of the WVTO,
the World Bank and the IMF, but also recognizes the need for greater coherence among
them in their common aims to promote growth, development, and prosperity.
* Implementation Issues: Even as the WVTO Members undertook the new Doha Development
Agenda, concerns were expressed regarding implementation of existing WTO agreements.
The Ministers in Doha addressed a wide range of developing country concerns regarding
implementation of previous WTO agreements in both the main Declaration and a separate
20. Doba Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 31-33.
21. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 34.
22. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 38-41.
23. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1, para. 36.
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Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.24 The Ministers provided for clarifying
existing provisions and seeking further work in various WTO Committees (e.g., Antidump-
ing, Subsidies). Issues that remain outstanding will become part of the WTO Work Program
or will be addressed in negotiations where they have been specifically mandated.
2. China's Accession to the WTO
After fifteen years of negotiations, W/TO Members formally approved the accession pack-
age for the People's Republic of China (China) on November 10, 2001 at the Fourth
Ministerial Conference." A month later, on December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd
Member of the WTO. China also indicated that it would join the W/TO Information
Technology Agreement.
On November 9, 2001, President George W Bush certified that China's accession to the
WTO would satisfy requirements set by Congress in 2000 for permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR) with China. 26 The President certified that the final terms of entry for
China into the WTO are at least equivalent to those agreed to bilaterally between the
United States and China in 1999. The President's certification was required under a law
the Congress passed in 2000 authorizing the grant of PNTR status to China."
3. Chinese Taipei's Accession to the WTO
The Fourth Ministerial Conference approved Chinese Taipei's accession to the VWTO
on November 11, 2001, the day after it approved China's accession."' OnJanuary 1, 2002,
Taiwan became the WTO's 144th Member. With the addition of China and Chinese Taipei
as WTO Members, WTO disciplines now cover approximately 97 percent of global trade.
4. Other Accessions to the WTO
In addition to the accessions of China and Chinese Taipei, the WTO also added two
other Members during 2001: Lithuania on May 8 and Moldova on July 26.29 On October
29, 2001, the Working Party on the Accession of Vanuatu concluded negotiations on that
country's accession package.30 Other countries took steps to begin the accession process. In
January 2001, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia submitted a formal request for accession
and a Working Party was established in February 2001.11 Formal requests for accession
were also submitted by the Bahamas and Tajikistan in May 2001, and Working Parties were
established for them in July 2001.32 In October 2001, the Syrian Arab Republic made a
formal request for accession. 3 Currently, the applications of twenty-seven countries
24. WTO Ministerial Conference, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/Min(01)/17 (Nov. 14,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
25. World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov.
10, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
26. Statement of the Press Secretary, President of the United States, President Certifies Terms of China's
Accession to WTO (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov (last visited July 24, 2002).
27. Id.
28. World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, WT/L/433 (Nov. 11, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
29. See World Trade Organization, New Requests and Completed Accessions, available at http://www.wto.org
(last visited July 24, 2002).
30. See World Trade Organization, Current Status of Individual Accessions, available at http://www.wto.org
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for WTO accession are in various stages of the access process negotiations. In terms of
trade volume, Russia and Saudi Arabia are among the most significant countries seeking
accession.
3 4
C. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE THE WTO-
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES
1. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was signed on October 24, 2001,
will eliminate duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and services orig-
inating in the United States and Jordan.3" President Bush signed the implementing legis-
lation on September 28, 2001, and the Agreement came into effect on December 17, 2001.
The FTA includes, for the first time in the text of a trade agreement, provisions addressing
trade and environment, trade and labor, and electronic commerce. Other provisions address
intellectual property rights protection, balance of payments, rules of origin, safeguards and
procedural matters such as consultations and dispute settlement. Because the United States
already has a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Jordan, the FTA does not include an in-
vestment chapter.
2. U.S.- Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement to Normalize Trade Relations
In July 2000, the United States and Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement, which
was ratified by the United States in October and by Vietnam in December of 2001.36 This
historic agreement normalizes trade relations between the two countries and represents an
important milestone in the decade-long normalization process that began in the 1990s. The
negotiations were conducted over a five-year period, beginning in 1996. With the entry
into force of the Agreement on December 10, 2001, Vietnam completed the conditions for
normal trade relations (NTR). Vietnam's status is subject to annual review under the
"Jackson-Vanik" provisions.
Under the Agreement, Vietnam has committed to opening its market to U.S. goods,
services and investment and to moving toward adoption of WTO and other international
trade and investment norms. The Agreement covers six major areas: market access for
industrial and agricultural goods; protection of intellectual property; market access for ser-
vices; investment protection; business facilitation; and transparency. The Agreement also
cuts tariffs on Vietnam's exports to the United States from 40 percent to about 4 percent.
In addition, it gives monopolies in the telecommunications and energy sectors several years
to improve efficiency as the Agreement gradually opens up Vietnam to U.S. service pro-
viders in a wide range of fields. If properly implemented, the pact could ease Vietnam's
eventual accession to the WTO.
34. For details, see the WTO Web site, http://www.wto.org.
35. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-Jordan, available at http://www.ustr.gov
(last visited July 24, 2002).
36. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade
Relations, July 13, 2000, U.S.-Vietnam, available at http://www.ustr.gov (last visited July 24, 2002).
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3. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement
Chile and the United States began negotiations of a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA)
in December 2000.11 The U.S.-Chile FTA would be the first free trade pact between the
United States and a country in South America. In the negotiations, the two countries seek
to create a comprehensive state-of-the-art agreement that reflects their shared commitment
to free trade and economic integration. Bilateral trade between the United States and Chile
has more than doubled in the past decade to nearly $6 billion annually. The negotiations
cover a broad array of areas that include market access for goods and services, standards,
intellectual property, investment, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, safeguards, customs,
rules of origin, agriculture, anti-dumping, government procurement, competition policy,
e-commerce and dispute settlement. It is also anticipated that the FTA will include labor
and environment provisions.
The two countries held their ninth round of negotiations in Miami in December. At that
time, U.S. and Chilean negotiators announced that a final deal was within reach, but further
negotiations would be needed in 2002 to finalize the Agreement. The issues of labor and
environment have yet to be fully addressed. It is anticipated that the FTA would be con-
cluded in 2002.
4. US.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
Negotiations of a U.S.-Singapore FTA, which began in December 2000, continued
throughout 2001 on a wide range of issues.3" The issues include trade in goods, customs
and rules of origin, textiles, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights and
government procurement. Significant progress was made in 2001 in a number of areas,
including services and rules of origin. The two sides agreed to adopt the negative list ap-
proach for services and investment and to develop state-of-the-art rules of origin to take
into account the globalization of manufacturing in a knowledge-based world economy.
Additional progress has also been achieved on enlarging the areas of convergence between
the two sides, resulting in a revised document of consolidated texts. Considerable work
remains on this undertaking, which is designed to achieve a world-class FTA. The agree-
ment is expected to be completed in 2002.
5. Free Trade Area of the Americas
The negotiations of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), launched by thirty-four
nations in the Western Hemisphere in June 1995, moved forward in 2001.19 The FTAA
work is organized into nine negotiating groups: market access; agriculture; government
procurement; investment; intellectual property rights; services; competition policy; dispute
settlement; and subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties. In addition, several non-
negotiating groups have been established. The Committee of Government Representatives
on Civil Society receives input into the negotiation process from all sectors of civil society.
The Consultative Group on Smaller Economies monitors the negotiations and makes rec-
37. See generally Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, available at http://www.chileinfo.com/fta (last visited
July 24, 2002).
38. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Joint Statement by the United
States and Singapore on the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Negotiations (Dec. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.ustr.gov (last visited July 24, 2002).
39. See generally Free Trade Area of the Americas, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited July 24,
2002).
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ommendations for addressing issues of concern to smaller economies. The Joint
Government-Private Sector Committee of Experts on Electronic Commerce, comprised
of both government and private sector representatives, makes recommendations in light of
the "rapid expansion of Internet usage and electronic commerce in the Hemisphere." 40
At the April 2001 FTAA Ministerial, the Trade Ministers reviewed the progress of the
negotiations, including the first consolidation of draft texts produced by the Negotiating
Groups. In a significant step aimed at keeping the negotiating process transparent, the
Ministers directed that the consolidated draft be made available to the public through the
FTAA's Web site. The FTAA Trade Negotiations Committee (FTAA TNC), which over-
sees the negotiations, is to prepare a second version of the draft FTAA Agreement for
review at the next Ministerial Meeting, which is to be held by October 2002 in Quito,
Ecuador. At the April Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, the leaders of the FTAA
countries agreed to conclude the negotiations of the FTAA by January 2005, with entry
into force of the new agreement by December 2005.
In 2001, the FTAA Ministers established a new Technical Committee on Institutional
Affairs to develop the overall architecture of an FTAA Agreement (general and institutional
matters). The Ministers instructed the FTAA TNC to continue its consideration of the
treatment of the differences in the levels of development and size of the economies of
the Hemisphere, including the smaller economies, and to provide ongoing guidance to the
Negotiating Groups in their consideration of proposals submitted by countries or groups
of countries in the substantive negotiating areas. Product- and sector-specific market access
negotiations will begin by May 15, 2002.
6. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 in response to
the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies. "Begun as an informal dia-
logue group, APEC has become the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade and
economic cooperation" within that region.41 "Its [aim] is to advance Asia-Pacific economic
dynamism and sense of community."42 APEC's 21-member economies accounted for 46.7
percent of global trade in 2000. The APEC Chair, which rotates annually among members,
is responsible for hosting the annual ministerial meeting of foreign and economic ministers.
China held the APEC Chair in 2001 and hosted the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in




Trade topics were at the head of the list of important issues debated by Congress this
year, however, action on the major bills occurred, if at all, only at the end of 2001. The
year saw trade issues moved to the back burner both as a result of the change in control of
the Senate and the tragic events of September 11. At year's end, the House of Represen-
40. See Free Trade Area of the Americas, Joint Government-Private Sector Committee of Experts on Electronic
Commerce, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
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tatives approved Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), 2001's most hotly debated trade topic,
by a single vote. The year ended, however, with major trade legislation unresolved, includ-
ing TPA, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and important export control legislation.
B. MAJOR TRADE LEGISLATION
1. Trade Promotion Authority
The decision to grant the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), formerly known
as "Fast Track," was the most hotly debated trade issue of the year. President Clinton had
previously been denied fast track authority, and the ability of the Bush administration to
gain approval in the House was seen by many to be a feather in the cap of Ambassador
Zoellick, the U.S. Trade Representative.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, H.R. 3005, was introduced in
the House on October 3, and passed by one vote in December.43 TPA provides the President
with authority to negotiate trade agreements that are brought back to Congress for an up
or down vote. The House approved the bill by a vote of 215 to 214, with 194 Republicans
and 21 Democrats voting for it. The TPA sets the overall negotiating objectives on trade
agreements for the United States, including:
(1) to further strengthen the system of international trading disciplines and procedures, in-
cluding dispute settlement; (2) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and promote
full employment in the United States and to enhance the global economy; (3) to ensure that
trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve
the environment... ,while optimizing the use of the world's resources; and (4) to promote
respect for worker rights and the rights of children. 4
The TPA sets forth the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with
countries regarding tariff and non-tariff barriers. Resulting trade agreements are required
to make progress in meeting the overall and principal trade negotiating objectives and
require that the President satisfy certain notification and consultation requirements, in-
cluding submission of the agreement for assessment by the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission. TPA also requires that the USTR consult closely with Congress during trade
negotiations.
Traditionally, concerns over environmental and labor issues have limited Democratic
support for TPA. Several GOP representatives from districts with significant textile indus-
tries supported the bill only after receiving last-minute promises from the Administration
and GOP leaders that their concerns will be addressed (including CBTPA issues).
In the beginning of December the Senate Finance Committee approved a modified ver-
sion of the House's Fast-Track bill by an 18-3 vote.45 The Senate's draft legislation includes
a provision for the United States to seek improved WTO panel adherence to the appro-
priate standard of review in dispute resolution. Chairman Baucus and Senator Grassley, the
ranking GOP member, developed the bipartisan Senate bill. The bill is similar to H.R.
3005 but includes additional language addressing investor-state disputes, trade laws, labor
issues, and congressional consultations. The Baucus-Grassley bill provides for Presidential
authority until June 2005, with a possible two-year extension.
43. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, H.R. 3005, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
44. Id.
45. Some Textile Republicans Vulnerable After Fast-Talk Vote, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 10, 2001.
VOL. 36, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 371
At year-end, the ultimate passage of TPA remained uncertain. Indeed, the likely differ-
ences in any final Senate and House versions of the legislation virtually guarantee that TPA
will remain the leading focus of Congressional trade debate in 2002.
2. ILSA Extension Act of 2001
The ILSA Extension Act of 2001, signed into law by the President on August 3, 2001,
effectively extends the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 for another five years.- The
previous act was set to expire in 2001. Some in the Bush administration had initially called
for only a two-year extension in order to maintain flexibility in the President's Libya and
Iran policies.47 Additionally, the ILSA Extension legislation lowers the ceiling on petroleum
investment in Libya from $40 million to $20 million, in accordance with the limit on such
investment in Iran.
OnJuly 16, 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee reported H.R. 1954, the ILSA
Extension Act, amended to include a provision that allows the two Houses of Congress to
terminate sanctions against Iran and Libya at any time by a joint resolution. The amend-
ment, which eased the burden for lifting sanctions, drew sharp criticism from families of
victims of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing and set the stage for a jurisdictional battle over
which committee's version should be adopted by the whole House. Though two versions
of the Bill came to the floor of the House on July 17, leaders moved to stall a vote until
after President Bush's return from Genoa, where he was attending the G8 summit. Some
saw passage of the bill as potentially detrimental to the President's efforts at securing Eu-
ropean support for American sanctions policy. Several European allies have been critical of
unilateral American sanctions on Iran, and House decision-makers sought to refrain from
hindering the President's efforts at reaching consensus.
Eventually, the House approved the International Relations Committee version, which
excluded language concerning congressional termination and rather directed the President
to report to Congress annually on the effectiveness of the sanctions. The Senate voted on
July 25 to pass S. 1218 without amendment by a vote of 96 to 2 (only Senators Hagel and
Lugar voted nay).40 Citing Iran's and Libya's support for terrorism as the primary factor in
his decision, the President signed the ILSA Extension Act on August 3, 2001.
3. Export Administration Act
The Senate passed S. 149, the revised Export Administration Act (EAA), on September
6, 2001 by a vote of 85 to 14. However, the Act stalled in the House, with consideration
of the measure delayed until February 2002. The EAA has not been substantially revised
since 1988.49 However, on November 27, the House approved H.R. 3189 to extend the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), until April 20, 2002.
S. 149 considerably modifies the previous Export Administration Act to ease government
restrictions and would allow U.S. companies to increase sales of high technology products.
The measure was strongly opposed by a group of powerful Republican Senators due to
national security concerns.5 0 In particular, the bill reauthorizes the EAA of 1979 and re-
46. ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 115 Stat. 199 (2001).
47. See generally INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 6, 2001.
48. See generally INsIDE U.S. TRADE, July 27, 2001.
49. Erport Controls: Senate Approves Business-Backed EAA Bill but Early Action by House Seen as Unlikely, 18
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 36, at 1422 (Sept. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Export Controls].
50. Status of Significant Trade Legislation, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 34, at 1357 (Aug. 23, 2001).
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vamps export controls on dual-use goods, products that could be used for civilian or military
purposes. The EAA is the statutory authority that authorizes the U.S. Department of Com-
merce to issue Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which provide for the classifi-
cation and licensing of dual-use exports."' S. 149 expands the President's discretion in
controlling sensitive dual-use exports and substantially increases the penalties for violation
of the U.S. export control regulations.52
The EAA was set to expire on August 20 until the House moved to extend consideration
until February 2002. Some Senate Republicans expressed concern that dual-use export
controls would be eased to include sales of missile technology to China. The Senate bill,
which did ease control on a limited scope of high-tech products, received the full support
of the White House and of the business lobby. Opponents of the legislation maintain that
loosened export controls, especially with respect to terrorist-supporting states, jeopardizes
U.S. national security interests.
4. Andean Trade Preference Act
The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPA), H.R. 3009, extends
the Andean Trade Preference Act, which provides trade benefits to Colombia, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru.53 ATPA is similar to the benefits conferred to Caribbean Basin Initiative
countries under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. H.R. 3009 would expand
the products covered, including textiles; however, it still faces strong opposition in the
Senate.14
ATPA authorizes the President to grant duty-free treatment to certain imports from the
designated countries through December 31, 2006. The Act was strongly opposed by the
U.S. textile industry due in part to the fact that it amends the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act and the African Growth and Opportunity Act to provide duty-free and quota
free treatment to imported apparel articles that are sewn or otherwise assembled, or cut in
a U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) or sub-Saharan African beneficiary
country from components knit-to-shape in the United States.5 ATPA also increases the
allowable amount over an eight-year period for certain apparel made from yarn in Sub-
Saharan African countries that can be imported into the United States duty free and quota
free.
H.R. 3009 was introduced in the House at the beginning of October, and was passed by
the House in November. The House version expands the benefits provided under the origi-
nal Act and extends it through December 31, 2006. The Senate Finance Committee ap-
proved legislation to renew and expand ATPA at the end of November but added fewer
new benefits than were included in the House bill. The Senate measure expands benefits
through February 28, 2006. The Bush administration has indicated that ATPA renewal was
a high priority since it represents an important foreign policy tool as to both international
trade and anti-narcotics objectives.
5 I. See Ecport Controls, snpra note 49.
52. See id.
53. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, H.R. 3009, 107th Cong. (lst Sess. 2001). The
previous legislation was set to expire on December 4, 2001.
54. Trade Policy: House Approves Measure to Fpand Andean Trade Benefits, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No.
46, at 1875 (Nov. 22, 2001).
55. Ways and Means Votes to Raise Limits on Africa, Caribbean Apparel, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 12, 2001.
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5. Trade Adjustment Assistance
Legislation to reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance program was introduced in
October.5 6 The House of Representatives approved a bill in December to reauthorize the
existing Trade Adjustment Assistance program and extend unemployment benefits for six
months. The House overwhelmingly voted for the bill by a vote of 420 to 3. On December
4, the Senate Finance Committee approved S. 1209 to reauthorize and expand TAA bene-
fits.57 Senator Baucus indicated that passage of TAA would likely be closely linked to Trade
Promotion Authority and would be scheduled for a vote in early 2002.
C. OTHER TRADE LEGISLATION
1. Extension of Normal Trade Relations Status to Vietnam
By joint resolution, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate approved the
extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (or Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status) with
respect to the products of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Along with the U.S.-Vietnam
Trade Agreement signed July 13, 2001, H.J. Res. 51Ipassed by voice vote in the House
and by a vote of 88 to 12 in the Senate-this legislation marks the symbolic end of hostilities
between the United States and Vietnam.58
More substantively, the Resolution opens the door to significant trade opportunities for
American importers and exporters. According to the World Bank, Vietnam's exports to the
United States could rise to $1.3 billion during the first year of NTR, a 60 percent increase
on exports in 2000.19 And the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Agreement requires that Vietnam extend
the same treatment to the United States, expanding the potential boon of Vietnam's 78
million-person market to U.S. exporters.
2. Jordan Free Trade Agreement
The President signed legislation implementing the agreement establishing a United
States-Jordan free trade area on September 28, 2001 .60 The House passed the bill imple-
menting the free trade agreement at the end of July on a voice vote.61 The Senate approved
the implementing legislation after Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) dropped his objections
concerning some of the more contentious provisions of the Agreement.62 The Free Trade
Agreement, negotiated by the Clinton administration, was extremely controversial due to
certain labor and environmental provisions. Specifically, the U.S.-Jordan agreement in-
cludes language that provides for the imposition of trade measures if either country dero-
gates from its labor or environmental protection laws in order to gain an advantage in
trade.63 The FTA will eliminate tariffs on almost all goods within ten years, but does contain
a safeguard provision. In effect, the implementing legislation provides for a trade remedy
56. Reauthorization of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, H.R. 3008, 107thCong. (lstSess. 2001).
57. Bush Letter Offers Support to Reward, Erpanded Andean Trade Act, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 11, 2001.
58. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 5, 2001.
59. See MARK E. MANYIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE VIETNAM-U.S. BILATERAL TRADE AcRE-
MENT (June 20, 2001); see also Reuters, Vietnam Trade Agreement: Summary of Key Provisions (July 13, 2001),
available at http://www.usvietnam.com/htmifiles/BTA_- Summary-ofKeyProvisions.html (last visitedJuly 24,
2002).
60. United States-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-43, 115 Stat. 243 (2001).
61. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 3, 2001.
62. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 28, 2001.
63. Trade Policy: Senate Panel-House Approve Measure on Jordan FTA, But Gramm Still Dissatiied, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 31, at 1244 (Aug. 2, 2001).
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action should the U.S. International Trade Commission determine that Jordanian goods
are being imported into the United States in such increased quantities and under such
condition that the imports constitute a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof
to the domestic industry.
3. Mexican Trucks
The President signed the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act 2002 into law on December 18, 2001.6 This legislation included a Congres-
sional compromise of safety measures after a NAFTA panel ruled against the United States.
Specifically, the panel held that the United States could not impose blanket restrictions on
Mexican trucking firms due to safety concerns, but must instead consider applications on a
case-by-case basis for Mexican operators. 61 In November, negotiators from the House and
Senate agreed to a deal on safety measures on Mexican trucking firms, which allows them
to operate in the United States." However, the legislation did not merely implement the
NAFTA panel ruling, instead it imposed several conditions on the President's ability to
implement the ruling.
4. Zimbabwe Sanctions
The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 was signed into law on
December 21, 2001.61 The House approved S. 494 on December 4 to allow President Bush
to sanction Zimbabwe. The Bill passed unanimously in the Senate and with a very large
(396-11) margin in the House. The Bill is intended to address the ongoing humanitarian
crises in that country. The Bill does this by specifically targeting assets of individuals held
outside of the country, limiting travel and imposing economic sanctions on those respon-
sible for the continuing unrest. President Robert Mugabe has ruled the country for more
than twenty years.
Additionally, the Act provides for the cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed to
the United States and certain international financial institutions by the Government of
Zimbabwe upon the President's certification regarding improvements in certain areas of
basic human rights. The Act also authorizes the President to provide foreign assistance
funds to Zimbabwe to support the establishment of democratic institutions, free press and
independent media, and the rule of law.
5. Export-Import Bank Reautborization
The charter of the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank or Bank) was set to expire on
September 30, 2001, and accordingly, the House and the Senate took up consideration of
the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2001, H.R. 2871 and S. 1372 respectively.
The Bill would have reauthorized the Bank through FY 2005, and would also have intro-
duced new requirements regarding the amount of export-iviport financing related to small
business. However, neither the Senate nor the House version of the Bill came to a floor
vote in 2001. The President signed continuing appropriations legislation on October 12,
effectively extending consideration of reauthorization legislation through March 2002.
64. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-87,
115 Stat. 833 (2001).
65. NAFTA: NAFTA Panel Faults U.S. for Barring Mexican Trucks on Across-the-Border Basis, 18 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA), No. 6, at 222 (Feb. 8, 2001).
66. Larson Expects Little Further Debate on TRIPS and Health in WTO, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 30, 2001.
67. Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-99, 115 Stat. 962 (2001).
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The Bill was stalled in part by concerns on the part of the Department of Treasury, which
has come into conflict with the Export-Import Bank over each entity's role in the operations
of the Tied Aid War Chest.68 The Export-Import Bank has also drawn criticism from some
environmental groups, which seek to influence the Bank's energy funding away from fossil
fuels and toward renewable energy sources. 69 Reauthorization of the Bank in 2002 will hinge
upon the Bank's perceived usefulness and efficiency in achieving U.S. international trade
objectives. There was strong support, however, by many Republican Senators and a coali-
tion of business groups in support of the Ex-Im Bank and its programs, which include
providing loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance to foreign entities that buy
U.S. products."'
1L. WTO Dispute Settlement Activity
In 2001, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) received twenty-seven requests for
consultations, leading to the establishment of eight panels." Another nine panels were
established to review cases initiated in 2000. The DSB adopted eight panel reports, two
without modification because the losing parties indicated they would not appeal, and seven
Appellate Body reports. As in 2000, the DSB continued to develop its interpretations of
the agreements covering antidumping and safeguard measures, and to address the extent
to which domestic laws and regulations operated as a trade restraint. The DSB's ongoing
willingness to adopt recommendations that required a change to members' laws and reg-
ulations was apparent in 2001. This policy forced countries to weigh the need to reconcile
their WTO obligations, as interpreted by the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), with
their domestic agendas. As such, implementation remains the most difficult phase of the
DSB process.
In 2001, three new members joined the Appellate Body to take the place of outgoing
members. Mr. James Bacchus (the United States) assumed the Chair. The WTO Director-
General opened an Advisory Centre for WTO Law, which aims to rectify the problems
developing countries have faced in accessing the DSB system by providing them with legal
aid at all stages of the DSM process.
A. SIGNIFICANT PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY REPORTS
1. United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat
From New Zealand and Australia"
The Appellate Body upheld a panel ruling faulting, on several grounds, a U.S. safeguard
measure that imposed a tariff on imports of lamb from Australia and New Zealand. Re-
68. See Reautborization of the U.S. Export-Import Bank: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman; and statement of
John Taylor, Under Secretary of Treasury for International Finance).
69. Re-authorize or Retire the Export Import Bank: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Monetary Policy
and Trade of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Ian Vasquez, Director,
Cato Institute Project on Global Economic Liberty).
70. Export Financing: 30 Republican Senators Urge Administration not to Cut Export-Import Bank Budget, 18 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 418 (Mar. 15, 2001).
71. From these cases initiated in 2001, the DSB received ten requests for the establishment of a panel. One
request was withdrawn and others were combined.
72. WTO Appellate Body, United States--Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat
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jecting the U.S. defense, the Appellate Body held that the "unforeseen developments" re-
quired under Article XIX l(a) of GAYT' to justify a safeguard measure, must be demon-
strated prior to the application of a safeguard measure. Currently, U.S. law does not require
the USITC, the investigating body, to examine the existence of unforeseen developments.
In the VTO case, the United States argued that this factor could be inferred from the
factual record of the investigating authority and then demonstrated during the DSB process.
The Appellate Body also agreed with the panel that the U.S. definition of U.S. lamb
meat industry unfairly included growers and feeders of live lamb, in violation of Article
4.1(c) of the Safeguards Agreement, which requires that the domestic industry be defined
exclusively by reference to "producers of a like or directly competitive product."' The
Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that the USITC failed to ensure that injury
caused by other factors was not attributed to imports, as required by Article 4.2(b) of the
Safeguards Agreement. This case was satisfactorily resolved when the United States re-
placed the tariff with adjustment assistance to the industry, although the "unforeseen de-
velopments" finding suggested a potentially significant interpretation with respect to all
safeguards investigations.
2. Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished
Leather74
This case, brought by the European Union (EU) with the United States claiming third-
party rights, addressed the extent to which a country's customs and tax requirements can
act as a restraint on trade. The panel rejected the EU's claims that the mere participation
of domestic industry representatives in the customs inspection exercises pressure and thus
restrains exports. However, the panel agreed with the EU position that the industry rep-
resentatives' access to confidential business information was unreasonable. The panel also
agreed with the EU that Argentina's practice of requiring tax down payments (or "pre-
payments") on imported goods increased the tax burden, in the form of interest payments,
on imports and thus discriminated between imported and competing domestic products.
Neither Argentina nor the EU appealed, and the panel report was adopted without mod-
ification.
3. United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Steel Products from Japan"
Japan initiated a complaint against the United States alleging that the preliminary and
final determinations of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (USITC) in their antidumping investigations of certain hot-rolled
steel products from Japan (issued in 1999) were erroneous, based on deficient procedures
under the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 and related regulations, and violated the Antidumping
Agreement. The panel report supported Japan's claims that the United States had erred in:
(1) refusing to consider additional information provided by three Japanese steel companies
from New Zealand and Australia, WT/DS177/AB/R & WAT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001), available at http://
www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
73. Id.
74. WATO Panel, Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather,
W1/DS I 55/R (May 1, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
75. WTO Appellate Body, United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, WT/DSI84/ABIR (July 24, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
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after the deadline for responses to the DOC's questionnaires; and (2) applying its "arms-
length" test to conclude that home market sales made by exporters to affiliated customers
at less than 99.5 percent of the prices charged to unaffiliated customers are not in the
"ordinary course of trade" and therefore not eligible for inclusion in the antidumping anal-
ysis. On appeal, the Appellate Body affirmed most of the panel's ruling, several panel find-
ings, including (1) and (2) above. However, the Appellate Body reversed the panel report
by finding that the United States had also erred in its injury analysis by not separating and
distinguishing the injurious effects of other known causal factors from the injurious effects
of the dumped imports. The United States has said that it intends to implement the DSB
recommendations.
4. India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector76
In this case, the United States and the European Union lodged a complaint against India's
regulations that required auto manufacturers to sign memoranda of understanding (MoU)
that imposed local content and trade balancing obligations on the signatories. Under the
local content provisions, MoU signatories were required to use a percentage of local content
parts in their passenger car production in India. Under the trade balancing provisions, MoU
signatories were required to offset their imports of auto kits and components into India
with exports of cars or car parts of at least equal value to those imports. (An earlier case
had deemed India ineligible to continue to use the balance of payment exception.) The
panel agreed with the United States that India's regulations imposed "unnecessary" barriers
on foreign investors wanting to invest in India's auto industry and were therefore incon-
sistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). At year-end,
India had not indicated whether it plans to appeal.
5. United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998"1
At the center of this dispute is the battle between Pernod of France and Bacardi over
who owns the U.S. rights to use the trademark "Havana Club" (giving the case its popular
name). Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act prohibits U.S. courts from
registering or enforcing trademarks or trade names associated with businesses confiscated
without compensation by the Cuban government unless the previous owner has consented.
Pernod claims global ownership of the trademark as a result of its agreement with the Cuban
government. U.S. courts have applied the legislation to deny Pernod's ownership to the
U.S. rights in the face of the competing claims of Bacardi that it owns the U.S. rights to
the "Havana Club" name as a result of its agreement with the family that owned the dis-
tillery at the time it was seized by the Cuban government. The panel rejected thirteen of
the EU's fourteen arguments questioning the consistency of Section 211 with the TRIPs
Agreement and found that trade names are not covered by TRIPs and that, in most respects,
Section 211 is not inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under TRIPs. The
panel did, however, fault the United States for failing to provide the means by which a
76. WTO Panel, India -Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS 146/R & WT/DS 175/R (Dec. 21,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
77. WTO Panel, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visitedJuly 24, 2002); WTO Appellate Body, United States- Section
211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176AB/R (an. 2, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last
visited July 24, 2002).
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claimant can assert ownership of a trademark before a U.S. court. In a reversal, the January
2, 2002 decision of the Appellate Body found that Section 211 does provide procedures for
asserting a claim, but that these procedures violate the most-favored-nation principle of the
WTO by imposing on non-U.S. nationals an extra legal step to assert protection of their
trademark rights. Both parties have claimed victory, and the implementation phase of this
case promises to present a challenge to the DSB process.
B. IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation phase of the DSB process can drag on for years as the losing party
takes halting or half-hearted measures that lead to one, or more, referrals of the case back
to the original panel. Several stand-offs between the United States and the EU are par-
ticularly illustrative.
In United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations,"0 a 2000 Appellate Body
decision had agreed with a panel that the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) law was
an illegal trade subsidy. The FSC law provides a mechanism by which more than 6,000
U.S. companies gain an annual tax break of about $4 billion through the exemption of most
of their foreign-earned income from taxation in the United States. In 2000, Congress passed
the Foreign Sales Corporation Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000,
which attempted to address VVTO objections while preserving the tax breaks. The Euro-
pean Union complained that the new law not only maintained the violations, but also
aggravated them. The reconvened panel agreed. The United States appealed this 2002
finding, and the EU cross-appealed.
In perhaps the best illustration of the limitations facing the DSB in a highly charged
dispute, the United States and the EU arrived at a political settlement in European Com-
munities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas case. Pursuant to the
parties' agreement, the EU replaced its quota system for African, Caribbean, and Pacific
countries, which lay at the heart of the dispute, with a new system of licenses, and by 2006
will introduce a tariff-only regime for banana imports. The United States will phase out
the increased duties imposed as a retaliatory measure, but may re-impose them should the
EU fail to complete implementation of the agreement.
In United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the Eu-
ropean Communities,79 the United States has said that it will, within a "reasonable period of
time," implement the original DSB 2001 ruling that the quantitative restriction imposed
on wheat gluten from the EU as a safeguard measure violates the Safeguards Agreement.
The EU responded that the only appropriate remedy is for the United States to immediately
withdraw the safeguard measure and that its "rebalancing" measure (i.e., restrictions im-
posed on imports of corn or maize gluten under provisions of the Safeguards Agreement)
will remain in place until the United States withdraws its safeguard restriction on wheat
gluten.
In Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft ,1 for the second time since the Ap-
pellate Body, in 1999, affirmed a panel report in favor of Canada, a panel has been estab-
78. W'O Appellate Body, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, VTIDS 108 (Feb.
24, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
79. W'O Appellate Body, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the
European Communities, WV/DS 166 (Dec. 22, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visitedJuly 24, 2002).
80. WVTO Appellate Body, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46 (Aug. 2, 1999),
available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
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lished to determine whether Brazil's export subsidy program complies with WTO rules
and with the DSB recommendations. At the meeting where this issue was discussed, Mem-
bers also discussed, without resolving, the question of whether the procedures that normally
apply for setting up a panel also apply for panels set up (or reconvened) to rule on "com-
pliance." If the procedures do apply, do they therefore require some form of consultation
before a request for a panel is tabled, and permit a member to block the first attempt to
create a panel?
As a result of U.S. and New Zealand complaints that Canada's new provincial schemes
are export subsidies like the national measures they replaced, the DSB has twice referred
the case of Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy
Products" back to the original panel, where the matter remained at year-end. The two
countries have argued that the failure of the Appellate Body to rule on the consistency of
Canada's measures with its WTO obligations lies at the heart of the ongoing disagreements.
The United States and New Zealand also requested DSB authorization to suspend con-
cessions against Canada-each in the amount of U.S.$35 million. Canada objected to these
amounts, and these matters were referred to arbitration. The arbitration process will be
suspended until the original panel completes its report.
In European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from
India,"2 the European Communities (now the EU) has brought into force its Regulation
No. 1644/2001 to implement the DSB rulings in this case, which dates back to 1996, when
the European Communities initiated an antidumping investigation into certain imports of
cotton-type bed linen from India and other countries. Although the antidumping measure
was suspended, India has expressed concern that the regulations do not fully implement the
rulings.
In United States - Measures Relating to the Import of Shrimp and Shrimp Products,3 the
Appellate Body affirmed that the new U.S. sea turtle protection law is fully WTO consistent
and compliant with DSB recommendations. This case began in 1997, when India, Malaysia,
Pakistan and Thailand brought a joint complaint against a ban imposed by the United
States on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products in order to protect sea
turtles. An Appellate Body ruling had determined that the U.S. law discriminated against
the four Asian complainants in the requirements imposed for their fisherman to transition
to the use of turtle-excluder devices.
The Appellate Body has agreed with the panel ruling in Mexico -Antidumping Investigation
of High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States, 4 that Mexico has failed to cure the flaws
the original panel found in Mexico's imposition of antidumping duties on U.S. imports of
high fructose corn syrup. Mexico had announced that it has complied with the ruling by
re-determining that there was a threat of injury to the domestic sugar industry and main-
taining the subject antidumping duties, while at the same time determining that the pro-
visional amounts paid would be refunded with interest.
81. VvTO Appellate Body, Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and Exportation of Dairy Prod-
ucts, WT/DS103 & WT/DS113 (Oct. 13, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
82. WTO Appellate Body, European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India, WT/DSI41 (Mar. 1, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
83. WTO Appellate Body, United States - Measures Relating to the Import of Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58 (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
84. WTO Appellate Body, Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United
States, WT/DS132 (Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
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In 2001, the following cases reached some sort of closure, either through a DSB report
certifying that implementation is complete or the agreement of the parties that implemen-
tation is complete, and/or the remedying party issuing a statement that it considers itself
to have met the terms of the DSB recommendations: United States - Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat;8 United States - Transitional Safeguard Measure
on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan;6 U.S. - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act;"7 Japan
- Measures Affecting Agricultural Goods,"s United States - Antidumping Measures on Stainless
Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea;89 Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beveragei-° and Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry.91
C. SUBSTANTIAL CASES PENDING BEFORE THE DSB
At the request of the EU the DSB has established three panels to examine complaints
against U.S. measures on steel imports. United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning
Certain Products from the EC9 involves twelve countervailing duty orders by the United
States on steel products from various EC Member States, with India and Mexico reserving
their third-party rights. United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant
Carbon Steel Flat Products From Germany93 concerns the EU's complaint about the U.S.
"sunset review" during which the Department of Commerce declined to revoke the coun-
tervailing duty order while finding that subsidization would likely continue at a rate of 0.54
percent. The EU alleges that this action violates the Subsidies Agreement because coun-
tervailing duty orders must be revoked where the rate of subsidization found is less than
the one percent de minimis standard for initial countervailing duty investigations. Japan
has reserved its third party rights in that case. United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures
on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular Welded Quality Line Pipe94 concerns two U.S. safe-
guard measures that the EU maintains are inconsistent with the Safeguards Agreement and
GATT 1994. Canada, Japan, and Mexico have reserved third party rights.
In a pending case, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd
Amendment),9 the DSB has established one panel to examine the complaints of eleven
85. WTO Appellate Body, United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb
Meat, WT/DS178/ABIR (May I, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
86. VITO Appellate Body, United States- Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarnfrom Pakistan,
WT/DS192 (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
87. WTO Panel, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160 0une 15,2000),available
at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
88. 'TO Panel, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Goods, WT/DS76 (Oct. 27, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
89. V/TO Panel, United States - Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet
and Strip from Korea, VITIDS 1 79/R (Dec. 22, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visitedJuly 24,2002).
90. VITO Panel, Chile - Taxes on Akoholic Beverages, WT/DS87 June 15, 1999), available at http://
www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
91. fO Panel, Canada -Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS I 39/R & Vr/DS 142/
R (Feb. 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
92. Wv,/TO Panel, United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the EC, VIT/
DS212/6 (Apr. 19, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
93. WO Panel, United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
From Germany, WT/DS213/5 (Apr. 15, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
94. VITO Panel, United States - Definite Safeguard Measure on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular Welded
Quality Line Pipe, VIT/DS214/4 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
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countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and
Thailand) against the U.S. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (known as
the "Byrd Amendment"). The co-complainants have alleged that the Act, which provides
for the redistribution of antidumping and countervailing duties to the "affected domestic
producers," provides double protection and not only violates the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, but also the Agreement on Anti-Dumping. In addition, Mex-
ico alleged that the Byrd Amendment payments were subsidies and actionable. Israel, Nor-
way, and Hong Kong, China reserved their third-party rights.
At Canada's request, the DSB has established a panel to review a second anti-dumping/
countervailing duty case, United States - Section 129(c) (1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act96 (URAA). Canada alleges that Section 129(c)(1) of the URAA, and the accompanying
Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) at page 1026 of the SAA, preclude the United
States from complying fully with DSB rulings in cases where the United States is found to
have acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations with respect to an antidumping or
countervailing duty proceeding. Chile, the EC, India, and Japan have reserved their third
party rights.
Another case pending between the United States and Canada is United States - Preliminary
Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,97 in which Canada com-
plains that the U.S. Department of Commerce preliminary countervailing duty determi-
nation and preliminary critical circumstances determination concerning certain softwood
lumber from Canada, as well as provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, are inconsistent with
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and with Article VI of
the GATT 1994.
The aircraft dispute between Canada and Brazil continues in Canada - Export Credits and
Loans Guarantees for Regional Aircraft9s with the establishment of a DSB panel in response
to Brazil's request to examine the W'TO compatibility of Canada's new aircraft financing
system. The EU, India, and the United States have reserved their third-party rights. In
Belgium - Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice,99 the United States




In 2001, countries around the world continued their active use of trade remedies. Ac-
cording to the WTO, 322 new antidumping cases were initiated between July 1, 2000 and
95. V/TO Panel, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offiet Act of 2000, WT/DS217/7 & WT/
DS234/15 (Apr. 19, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
96. WTO Panel, United States- Section129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/5 (Feb.
9, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
97. WTO Panel, United States - Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WT/DS236/2 (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
98. WTO Panel, Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees fir Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/7 (May 24,
2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
99. WTO Panel, Belgium - Administration of Measures Establisbing Customs Duties for Rice, WT/DS210/6
(Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
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June 30, 2001, and definitive measures were imposed in 185 cases during the same period.l 00
The United States led the world in initiations with 77, while India and the European
Community followed with 37 and 29 initiations respectively. 0' India imposed 41 definitive
measures, more than any other country, followed closely by the EC with 36 and the United
States with 20.102 The People's Republic of China continued to be the most frequent target
of antidumping initiations, 03 and steel continued to be the industry most often investi-
gated. 104 In the United States, trade remedy actions in 2001 were dominated by the Steel
201 investigation.
B. IMPORT ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION DEVELOPMENTS
1. Steel 201
In June 2001, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) asked the ITC to initiate
a Section 201 investigation of steel imports covering a broad range of imported steel prod-
ucts. Products covered by the investigation were divided into four broad categories--carbon
and alloy flat products, carbon and alloy long products, carbon and alloy tubular products,
and stainless and tool steel products'o'-and further subdivided these products into thirty-
three subcategories. 1 6 The case was the largest and most complex safeguard investigation
ever carried out by the Commission. Indeed, some members of the domestic industry
thought the scope was too broad, and opposed imposition of a remedy and/or voiced com-
plaints about the Administration's failure to consult prior to casting such a wide net.107
After a grueling schedule of briefing and hearings, the Commission made affirmative
injury determinations with respect to carbon and alloy slab, plate, hot-rolled, cold-rolled,
coated, flat products, hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar, rebar, flanges, welded tubular prod-
ucts other than OCTG, and stainless steel bar and rod.10o The Commission made negative
determinations with respect to carbon and alloy grain-oriented electrical steel, (GOES),
ingots, rails, wire, strand, nails, shapes, fabricated structural units, seamless tubular products
other than OCTG, seamless OCTG, and welded OCTG, and stainless slabs/ingots, plate,
cloth, rope, seamless tubular products, and welded tubular products. 1°9 The Commission
100. WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Reports Under Article 16.4, G/ADP/N/83 at Annex C
(Nov. 5, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24, 2002).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. WvrTO, Anti-Dumping: Statistics, Initiations: by Affected Country from 01/01/95 to 30/06/01, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/adp.stattabl..e.htm (last visited July 24, 2002).
104. wro, Anti-Dumping: Statistics, Measures: by Affected Country from 01/01/95 to 30/06/01, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/adpstattab9-e.hon (last visited July 24, 2002).
105. See Press Release, International Trade Commission, ITC Details its Determinations Concerning Im-
pact of Imports of Steel on U.S. Industry (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.usite.gov (last visitedJuly 24,
2002) [hereinafter ITC Injury].
106. Id.; Carbon &s Alloy Flat products: Slab, plate, hot-rolled, cold-rolled, grain oriented electrical steel
(GOES), coated steel, tin mill products; Carbon & Alloy Long Products: Hot bar, cold bar, rebar, rails, wire,
strand, nails, heavy shapes, fabricated units; Carbon & Alloy Tubular Products: seamless, seamless oil country
tubular goods (OCTG), welded, welded OCTG, flanges; Stainless & Tool Steel Products: bar, rod, tool steel,
wire, cloth, rope, seamless tubular, welded tubular, flanges.
107. See, e.g., International Trade Commission, Hearing Transcript at 2314 (Sept. 28, 2001) (testimony of
Mr. Luberda on behalf of the domestic stainless seamless hollow products industry, opposing relief); id. at 2352
(testimony of Mr. Sharkey of Gerlin, USA, a domestic manufacturer of stainless flanges, opposing relief).
108. ITC Injury, supra note 105.
109. Id.
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was equally divided with respect to carbon and alloy tin mill products; tool steel, stainless
wire, and stainless fittings." 0
The Commissioners appear to have tried to present a unified position at the injury phase.
A unanimous Commission supported all affirmative injury findings."' Negative findings
were unanimous or four to two splits with dissents coming from Commissioners Bragg and
Devaney in each case."' Bragg and Devaney voted affirmatively on each of the tie votes;
they were joined by Commissioner Miller for tin mill products and Chairman Koplan for
the remaining tie votes."'
The remedy recommendations broke down along similar lines, with Bragg and Devaney
generally recommending higher tariff amounts than their colleagues. For most products
with affirmative injury findings Chairman Koplan and Commissioners Miller and Hillman
recommended a 20 percent tariff for the first year, phasing down to 17 percent, 14 percent,
and 11 percent over the next three years." 4 With respect to slab and welded tubular products
Koplan, Miller and Hillman were joined by Commissioner Okun in recommending tariff-
rate quotas.' Commissioners Bragg and Devaney recommended first year tariffs of 40
percent for most flat products, 35 percent for long products, and 30 percent for tubular
products. Bragg recommended first-year tariffs of 25 percent for stainless and tool steel
products, while Devaney recommended a quota based on 1996-1998 import levels plus a
15% tariff.' 16 Commissioner Okun recommended quotas on all products for which she made
a recommendation.' '
7
Shortly after the ITC released its remedy recommendations, EU officials began threat-
ening WTO action on grounds that the ITC's injury findings were contrary to the WTO
Safeguards Agreement."' The USTR's request for additional information about the ITC's
consideration of unforeseen developments, economic analysis, and NAFTA exclusions ' 9
and the ITC's response to that request 20 appeared tailored to address issues that might be
of specific concern in a VTO challenge.' 2'
110. Id. If the Commission is equally divided the president may consider the determination of either group




114. See International Trade Commission, Steel Determination Publication 3479, Annex C (Dec. 7, 2001),




118. See, e.g., Possible EU Challenge of U.S. Steel Section 201 Would Focus on ITC Finding, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Dec. 21, 2001.
119. See Letter from United States Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick to International Trade Com-
mission Chairman Stephan Koplan (an. 3, 2002).
120. See Letter from Stephen Koplan to Robert Zoellick (Jan. 9, 2002) and Response of Commission to
Questions I and 3 of USTR Request of January 3, 2002 (Feb. 4, 2002).
121. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body, United States - Definitive Measures On Imports of Wheat Gluten from the
European Communities, WT/DSI16/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July 24,
2002) (finding that the U.S. acts violated agreement in its treatment of Canada); WTO Appellate Body, United
States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australian,
WT/DS 177, 178/AB/R (May 1, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visitedJuly 24, 2002) (finding U.S.
acts violated agreement in failing to demonstrate existence of unforeseen developments).
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After a set of hearings conducted by the USTR and a period of intense lobbying by all
parties, President Bush proclaimed a steel remedy on March 5, 2002. The President im-
posed tariffs of 30 percent on flat products (except slab), tin mill products, and hot and
cold-finished bar. 22 Tariffs of 15 percent were imposed on rebar, certain tubular products,
and stainless steel rod.'23 Fittings, flanges, and stainless steel wire received slightly lower
tariffs. 24 For two of the four products that received tie injury votes the President elected
to impose a safeguard remedy."' A tariff-rate quota of 5.4 million short tons was imposed
on slab with a 30 percent out-of-quota tariff., ' The slab quota allowed by the President
was less than the 7 million ton quota recommended by the Commission majority.'12 In all,
the remedies imposed by President Bush were generally more stringent than those rec-
ommended by the Commission majority, but less than those recommended by Commis-
sioners Bragg and Devaney. 2s The proclamation was condemned by virtually all of the
United States' trading partners and sparked an intense political and media debate, with
many viewing the President's decision as a political one calculated to secure Republican
votes in West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. 29
2. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
The year 2001, particularly the early months, was dominated by the steel investigations
that arose from the many petitions brought in the wake of the unprecedented steel import
surge in 1998. Two broad new orders imposed duties on hot-rolled flat products from nine






127. See Steel Determination, supra note 114.
128. See Press Release, The Executive Office of the President, Fact Sheet: Regarding the PresidentialAction
on Steel (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov (last visited July 24, 2002).
129. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Testing His Metal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at A21; David E. Sanger, March
3-9: Economy; Man of Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at D2; Jennifer L. Rich, U.S. Admits that Politics Was
Behind Steel Tariffi, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 14, 2002, at WI (responding to the alleged political nature of the
President's 201 remedy decision the European Union has attempted to target its retaliation at goods produced
in swing states such as Florida, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and West Virginia). See Geoff Winestock & Neil King
Jr., EU to Target GOP Over Steel Tariffs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002.
130. See, e.g., Notice of Countervailing Duty Order: Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Argentina, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,173-01 (Sept. 11, 2001); Notice of Countervailing Duty Order: Certain Hot-rolled
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Thailand, 66 Fed. Reg. 60,197 (Dec. 3, 2001); Notice of Countervailing Duty
Order: Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from South Africa, 66 Fed. Reg. 60,201 (Dec. 3, 2001);
Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Indonesia, 66 Fed. Reg.
10,192-01 (Dec. 3, 2001); Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from
India, 66 Fed. Reg. 60,194-01 (Dec. 3, 2001); Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel
Flat Products from Ukraine, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,559-02 (Nov. 29, 2001); Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Netherlands, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,565-01 (Nov. 29, 2001); Anti-
dumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Taiwan, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,563-01
(Nov. 29, 2001); Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Thailand,
66 Fed. Reg. 59,562-01 (Nov. 29, 2001); Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Romania, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,566-01 (Nov. 29, 2001); Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Hot-
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Kazakhstan, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,567-01 (Nov. 29, 2001).
131. Antidumping Duty Order: Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Belarus, Indonesia, Latvia, Moldova,
People's Republic of China, Poland, Republic of Korea and Ukraine, 66 Fed. Reg. 46,777-02 (Sept. 7, 2001).
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were also imposed on large diameter line pipe fromJapan,5 2 steel angle fromJapan, Korea,
and Spain, 3 3 and butt-weld pipe from Italy, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 3 4 An investi-
gation into Steel Wire Rope from China, India, and Malaysia eventually resulted in no
order, following a negative dumping finding for Malaysia and no-injury determinations for
India and China.35 Non-steel products receiving antidumping or countervailing duty orders
included, honey, magnesium, and ammonium nitrate.
136
Commerce and the ITC continued to interpret (or reinterpret) agency procedure and
various aspects of the U.S. trade remedies laws in 2001. Notable Commerce decisions
included:
- Low Enriched Uranium from FranceI37/Definition of Goods under U.S. Trade Remedy Laws.
Commerce clarified the definition of goods under U.S. antidumping laws in its final decision
in an antidumping investigation of low enriched uranium (LEU). Respondents argued that
enriched uranium shipped to the United States pursuant to processing contracts was not
subject to the AD/CVD laws because foreign uranium processors were selling enrichment
services rather than LEU-the subject merchandise. The Department rejected this argument,
finding that enrichment constituted substantial transformation such that the enriched ura-
nium entering the United States was a product of the country where it was enriched regard-
less of the commercial arrangement between the exporter and the purchaser in the United
States.
Automotive Replacement Glass from China/Tainted Import and Surrogate Values. In its final
decision in Automotive Replacement Glass from China,' Commerce reinforced its policy of
not using dumped or subsidized import prices in calculating CV or NME surrogate values
and clarified the standard of proof required to show that import prices are tainted. The
Department refused to use import values to China or to the surrogate country (India) where
there was "reason to believe or suspect" that the import prices were distorted by export
subsidies. The Department rejected respondents' argument that it must find that substantial
evidence supported the subsidy finding, explaining that it need only base its decision on
generally available information. Under this standard, Commerce found evidence of non-
specific export subsidies adequate to preclude use of the prices in question despite respon-
dents' argument that benefits from the subsidies were de minimis. The Department refused,
however, to disregard import prices on grounds that the product in question was dumped
132. Antidumping Duty Order: Large Diameter Line Pipe from Japan, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,368-01 (Dec. 6,
2001).
133. Antidumping Duty Order: Stainless Steel Angle from Japan, Korea and Spain, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,628-
01 (May 18, 2001).
134. Antidumping Duty Order: Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from Italy, Malaysia and the Phil-
ippines, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,257-01 (Feb. 23, 2001).
135. Antidumping Duty Order: Honey from Argentina, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,672-01 (Dec. 10, 2001); Anti-
dumping Duty Order: Pure Magnesium in Granular Form from the People's Republic of China, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,636-01 (Nov. 19, 2001). Antidumping Duty Order: Solid Agricultural Grade Ammonium Nitrate from
Ukraine; 66 Fed. Reg. 47,451-01 (Sept. 12, 2001).
136. Antidumping Duty Order: Honey from Argentina, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,672-01 (Dec. 10, 2001); Anti-
dumping Duty Order: Pure Magnesium in Granular Form from the People's Republic of China, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,636-01 (Nov. 19, 2001). Antidumping Duty Order: Solid Agricultural Grade Ammonium Nitrate from
Ukraine; 66 Fed. Reg. 47,451-01 (Sept. 12, 2001).
137. Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Low Enriched Uranium from France,
66 Fed. Reg. 65,877-01 (Dec. 21, 2001).
138. International Trade Commission, Automotive Replacement Glass from China, A-570-867, 67 ITADOC
6482 (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.usitc.gov (last visited July 24, 2002).
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into a third country, finding that evidence of dumping into a third country was not evidence
that the same product was dumped into the exporting country or a surrogate country.
- Non-Market Economy Status/Russian Federation and Latvia. At Latvia's request Commerce
reviewed and revoked that country's non-market economy (NME) status. 139 At the request
of a steel producer, Commerce initiated review of the NME status of the Russian Federa-
tion.'40
At the ITC, three preliminary determinations provided further insight into the Com-
mission's criteria for finding no reasonable indication injury at the preliminary stage. In
preliminary determinations on Softwood Lumber from Canada141 and Circular Welded Non-
Alloy Steel Pipe from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Romania and South Africa,14' the Commission
found no material injury but allowed the investigations to proceed with respect to threat
of injury.
In the case of lumber, the Commission concluded that there was no injury because the
domestic industry was protected by the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement until imme-
diately before the petition was filed. Over objections from the respondents, the Commission
found that the Agreement did not preclude a finding of threat of injury despite wording in
the Agreement stating that its purpose was to ensure no injury or threat of injury.143
In welded non-alloy pipes, the Commission found that the absence of price suppression/
depression and evidence that the domestic industry was reasonably profitable despite the
economic downturn supported a finding that there was no reasonable indication of injury
to the domestic industry. 44 With respect to threat of material injury, the Commission
elected to cumulate imports from all countries but China. 41 It found no threat from the
cumulated countries but found that the rapid increase in import volumes from China and
the growing inventories in the country supported a threat finding. 1'
In Spring Table Grapes from Chile and Mexico, the Commission declined to make an affir-
mative injury or threat of injury finding.' 47 The Commission's decision arose largely from
its refusal to accept the domestic industry's seasonal definition of the U.S. industry. While
finding that seasonality could be a factor in like product definition, the Commission refused
to allow it to dominate the like product decision.' 4 Once the Commission included pro-
139. See Memorandum from Holly A. Kuga to Troy H. Cribb: Non-Market Economy Status Revocation
(Jan. 12, 2001).
140. Notice of Initiation of Inquiry Into the Status of the Russian Federation as a Non-Market Economy
Country Under the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws Investigation No. [A-821-816; 66 Fed. Reg.
54,197 (Oct. 26, 2001).
141. International Trade Commission, Softwood Lumberfrom Canada, Investigation Nos. 701-TA-414 and 731-
TA-928 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 3426 (May 2001), available at http://www.usitc.gov (last visited July 24,
2002).
142. International Trade Commission, Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from China, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Romania, and South Africa, Investigations Nos. 731-TA-943-947 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 3439 (uly2001),
available at http://www.usitc.gov (last visited July 24, 2002).
143. Softwood Lumber, supra note 141, at 13.
144. Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe, supra note 142, at 16.
145. Id. at 17.
146. Id. at 17-20.
147. International Trade Commission, Spring Table Grapes from Chile and Mexico Investigations Nos. 731-TA-
926 and 927 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 3432 (June 2001).
148. Id. at 6.
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duction from beyond the limited three-month period proposed by the petitioners, the injury
indicators largely disappeared. 149
In 2001, the Commission also issued its first determination under Section 129 of the
URAA.150 That provision allows the USTR to request an advisory report on whether steps
could be taken to bring Commission action into conformity with an adverse WTO decision
and to request that ITC issue a determination to bring the proceeding into conformity. 5'
Following adverse decisions by a WTO dispute panel and the Appellate Body with respect
to the 1998 safeguards action on Wheat Gluten, 52 the USTR invoked Section 129.1'" In
the Section 129 proceeding, the Commission adopted its original views on injury but sup-
plemented the discussion of its findings in an attempt to satisfy the deficiencies found by
the Appellate Body. 4
3. Sunset Reviews
Commerce and the ITC faced a comparatively light schedule of five-year sunset reviews
in 2001.'"5 Contrary to past practice, the vast majority of reviews resulted in continuation
of the order. The only orders revoked were Manganese metal from China;S' polyvinyl
alcohol from China, Japan, and Taiwan;' and line and pressure pipe from Italy.5 s Man-
ganese metal and polyvinyl alcohol were both pro forma revocations without any domestic
industry participation.5 9 The line pipe order was revoked only after the ITC found no
likelihood of continued injury.
Steel orders remained in place for GOES, stainless steel bar, line and pressure pipe from
Argentina, Brazil, and Germany, and clad steel plate from Japan.160 All were expedited reviews
at Commerce. The ITC's three-to-three GOES decision was Commissioner Devaney's first
vote and produced much controversy as his vote allowed the continuation of an order that
would otherwise have been revoked. As discussed below, a challenge to that decision is
currently before the Court of International Trade (CIT) where the court has ordered discov-
ery on the validity of Devaney's appointment.'0 ' Following expedited reviews at Commerce,
orders were also continued on pasta from Italy and Turkey; 62 garlic from China; 163
149. Id. at 15-22.
150. Uruguay Round Agreement Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3538 (2002).
151. Id.
152. See WTO Appellate Body, United States - Definite Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from
the European Communities, WT/DS 166/AB/ic (Dec. 22, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited July
24, 2002).
153. Wheat Gluten: Procedures for Determination Under Section 129(a)(4) of the URAA, 66 Fed. Reg.
18510 (Apr. 9, 2001).
154. Id.
155. See Import Administration, Sunset Review Statistics, available at http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/sunset/
ssy2krev.htm (last visited July 25, 2002).
156. January 2001 Sunset Reviews: Final Results and Revocation, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,524 (Apr. 2, 2001).
157. April 2001 Sunset Reviews: Final Results and Revocations, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,145 (May 3, 2001).
158. Revocation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,999 (July 16, 2001).
159. April 2001 Sunset Reviews: Final Results and Revocation, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,524 (May 3, 2001); Jan.
2001 Sunset Reviews: Final Results and Revocation, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,145 (Apr. 2, 2001).
160. 66 Fed. Reg. 65,295; 66 Fed. Reg. 25,909; 66 Fed. Reg. 36,949; Final Results of Expedited Sunset
Review: Clad Steel Plates fromJapan, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,007 (Oct. 5, 2001).
161. Nippon Steel v. International Trade Commission, No. 01-153, slip. op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, Dec. 28,
2001).
162. Certain Pasta from Italy & Turkey, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,679 & 55,697 (Nov. 2, 2001).
163. Continuation of Antidumping Duty Order on Fresh Garlic From People's Republic of China, 66 Fed.
Reg. 14,544 (Mar. 13, 2001).
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helical spring lock washers from China and Taiwan;64 silicon manganese from Brazil,
China, and Ukraine;15 and silicon metal from Brazil and China. 66
C. COURT DECISIONS
1. Micron Technology/CEP Selling Expenses
In 2 001, the Federal Circuit returned to the difficult issue of defining constructed export
price (CEP). In Micron Technology Inc. v. United States,16 the court upheld Commerce's
decision not to deduct indirect selling expenses from the sales price in calculating CEP
unless those expenses were associated with sales in the United States. The statutory clause
at issue, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(D), requires that the price used to establish CEP be
reduced by "any selling expenses not deducted under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).' ' 168
Commerce determined that paragraph (D) did not require the deduction of indirect selling
expenses from the price used to establish CEP unless those expenses were associated with
sales in the United States. Petitioner Micron Technologies appealed to the CIT and then
to the Federal Circuit. Micron argued that prior to the enactment of the URAA, Commerce
and the CIT had interpreted the corresponding subparagraph in the previous statute to
include all indirect selling expenses. Congress, Micron argued, must be presumed to be
aware of the prior interpretation and to have intended that the provision continue to be
interpreted in the same manner. The Court rejected Micron's argument, holding instead
that Congress merely adopted the same ambiguous language contained in the old statute.
The Court gave deference to Commerce's interpretation of the statute as requiring deduc-
tion of only those selling expenses of a kind similar to those articulated in subparagraphs
(A), (B), and (C), that is, expenses associated with sales in the United States. In the same
decision, the Federal Circuit found that the statute unambiguously requires that Commerce
deduct the selling expenses set forth in Section 1677a(d) from the price used to establish
CEP, prior to making a level of trade comparison. 169
2. Thai Pineapple/Changing Raw Material Costs in COP Calculations
In Thai Pineapple Canning Industry v. United States, 110 the Federal Circuit required Com-
merce to change its methodology for matching costs to sales when using constructed value
to determine normal value. The court found Commerce's decision to use a single weighted-
average cost for the entire review period unreasonable because it distorted the calculation
of dumping margins.'' Evidence showed that the cost of the raw material (fresh pineapple)
increased significantly over the period of investigation and that the merchandise remained
164. Continuation of Antidumping Duty Orders on Helical Spring Lock Washer from China and Taiwan,
66 Fed. Reg. 11,255 (Feb. 23, 2001).
165. Certain Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,525 (Apr. 2, 2001).
166. Continuation of Antidumping Duty Orders on Silicon Metal from Brazil and China, 66 Fed. Reg.
10,669 (Feb. 16, 2001).
167. Micron Tech. v. U. S., 243 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
168. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(A) - (C). Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of the subsection include commissions for
selling in the United States, expenses directly related to the sale, and selling expense the seller pays on behalf
of the purchaser.
169. Micron Tech., 243 F.3d at 1316.
170. Thai Pineapple Canning Industry Corp. v. United States, 273 F.3d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
171. Id.
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in inventory due to a significant delay between production and sale, creating the appearance
that sales in the early part of the period were below cost of production and those in the
later part of the period had very high profit margins. The case was remanded to Commerce
with instructions to match sales of goods to costs based on the period in which those goods
were manufactured, taking into account the inventory period.'72
3. Shakeproof/Imported Inputs as Surrogate Value
In Sbakeproof Assembly Components v. United States,7' the Federal Circuit upheld Com-
merce's decision to base non-market economy factor of production values on the actual
price of inputs imported from a market economy instead of using values in a surrogate
country. Petitioners urged Commerce to use Indian prices to estimate the value of steel
used in manufacturing the subject merchandise. Commerce elected instead to use the actual
value of steel imported from England. In what may be a blow to petitioners who have relied
on Commerce's use of relatively high Indian factor prices to estimate Chinese costs of
production, the Federal Circuit found that the actual price paid for inputs imported from
a market economy in meaningful quantities is the best available information and promotes
accuracy in dumping calculations.11
4. Mitsubisbi Heavy Industries/Custom Made "Like Products"
Following two remands by the CIT, the Federal Circuit upheld Commerce's determi-
nation that large, custom-made printing presses sold in the United States and Japan were
like products, despite individual differences between the products.' In a 1996 dumping
investigation of large newspaper printing presses from Japan, Commerce determined that
custom-made presses sold in Japan and the Untied States were like products for the purposes
of a dumping determination and based its constructed value calculation on the profit earned
on sales in the Japanese market. The CIT twice remanded the determination to Commerce
for a better explanation of the profit calculation and the basis upon which the two products
could be reasonably compared. Both courts finally accepted Commerce's explanation that
the home-market presses were like products because "both markets share detailed product
characteristics" and a common use: "to produce newspapers."' 7 6 Over protests by the re-
spondents that Commerce's questionnaire was drafted to ensure responses showing com-
mon characteristics, the court reminded respondents that there is a presumption of regu-
larity in Commerce determinations and reiterated that the "substantial evidence" test
presents a "high barrier to reversal."' 77
5. Nippon Steel/Challenge to Devaney Recess Appointment
In a sunset review decided shortly after Commissioner Devaney joined the ITC, the
Commission voted three-to-three that revoking the order would likely lead to continuation
or recurrence of injury to the domestic industry. Nippon Steel challenged this determina-
tion at the CIT.17s In addition to challenging the determination on the merits, Nippon Steel
172. Id.
173. Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, 268 F.3d. 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
174. Id.
175. Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
176. Id. at 1060.
177. Id.
178. Nippon Steel v. United States, at slip op. 01-153.
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raised a constitutional challenge to Devaney's participation in the vote, arguing that neither
a vacancy nor a recess existed at the time of his appointment by President Clinton. The
ITC maintained that the CIT did not have jurisdiction and that Nippon Steel had no
standing to challenge the appointment. Styling the case as a challenge to the ITC's adher-
ence to its own rules rather than a direct challenge to President Clinton's exercise of the
appointment power, the CIT found jurisdiction."19 The court found the plaintiffs had suf-
fered injury-in-fact and therefore had standing.'8 0 Although discovery is not normally per-
mitted in § 1581(c) cases, the court granted Nippon's discovery requests seeking informa-
tion on the timing of the recess appointment.''
6. Nippon and Altx/Quality of ITC Determinations
In a pair of cases issued in late 2001, the CIT took the ITC to task for writing conclusory
opinions, with little explanation of its analysis and findings. In Altx v. United States, the
court remanded a four-to-two finding of no-injury to the Commission for reevaluation and
reconsideration.l"' In Nippon Steel v. United States the court remanded a four-to-two affir-
mative determination.' s  Throughout both cases, the court found that the Commission
failed to support its reasoning,8 4 neglected to address contrary data, 8 ' and failed to provide
adequate support in its written opinion. In both cases, the ITC's attempt before the court
to support its findings with staff report data were dismissed as "post hoc rationales."'8 6 It
remains to be seen whether the court's criticism of the cursory ITC opinions will open the
door for more court challenges by dissatisfied parties or will elicit changes in how ITC
opinions are drafted.
7. Save Domestic Oil/Criminal Contempt
Save Domestic Oil v. United States' 7 took several unusual turns during the course of 2001.
Petitioners had challenged Commerce's decision not to initiate controversial dumping and
subsidy investigations of crude oil from Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Mexico. The
CIT remanded to Commerce for initiation or further clarification, and denied the Gov-
ernment's motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the remand."s' The Govern-
ment appealed to the Federal Circuit and moved to stay the CIT order pending appeal.
The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that a remand to Commerce was not a
final, appealable order.1"9 Angered by DOJ's failure to obtain a stay during the appeal, the
CIT judge began criminal contempt proceedings against the Government, jailing a DOJ
attorney for a number of hours. 90 The Federal Circuit then granted a writ of mandamus
sought by the Government and found that the criminal contempt proceedings were an
179. Id. at 11.
180. Id. at 12.
181. Id. at 14.
182. Altx v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (Ct. Ind. Trade 2001).
183. Nippon Steel v. United States, slip op. 01-154 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 31, 2001).
184. See, e.g., id. at 19; see also Altx, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1360, 1362, 1363.
185. See, e.g., Nippon Steel, slip op. at 25, 29; Altx 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1359, 1363.
186. Altx, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1360; Nippon Steel, slip op., at 20.
187. Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 2000 MIL 883643 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 6, 2001).
188. Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000).
189. Id.
190. Save Domestic Oil Inc. v. United States, 2001 WL 883643 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 6, 2001).
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abuse of judicial discretion and directed the CIT to vacate the orders initiating contempt
proceedings. 19 Judge Aquilino saw the CAFC's action as premature and filed a cert petition
at the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn it. However, the Supreme Court denied cert. At
year-end, Commerce's remand determination, which again declined to initiate the AD/
CVD investigations, was still pending before the CIT.
191. In re United States, 2001 WL 1173202 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2001).
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